Philosophy The Problem of Free Will

[Second Summer]

No message board is complete without a long thread on free will!

What is free will? Do we have it? How does it work, exactly? Is it hindered or facilitated by determinism or its counterpart, indeterminism? If we live in a deterministic universe, how can there be room for free will? Or if the universe is indeterministic and events can presumably occur at random for no particular reason, how does that facilitate free will?

 

[Blobbenstein]

free will came first, I think, and the Universe came after.

 

[beancounter]

free will came first, I think, and the Universe came after.

Intelligently designed free will?

 

[beancounter]

I think we have free will within boundries. The boundries are the result of a combination of social norms and personal life experiences that either expand or limit our free will.

A good example of personal experience limiting free will: I've heard that if you chain a baby elephant it will not be able to break free, so when it matures to an adult, the same strength chain can be used to restrain it, and even though it could easily break free, it won't try because it expects not to be able to.

BTW, I'm not advocating chaining animals, this is just an analogy....

 

[cornsail]

I ask this question in every free will discussion that comes up. Free from what? Free is a relative term, so as far as I can tell it should have to refer to some specific constraint that is not in place. How do people define "free will"?

Or if the universe is indeterministic and events can presumably occur at random for no particular reason, how does that facilitate free will?

Good question. If "free will" means "will free from determinism" or "free from causality", then that would suggest that making decisions arbitrarily for no reason would be more likely to be an exercise of "free will" than making decisions in a way that makes sense with respect to prior events.

 

[Second Summer]

I ask this question in every free will discussion that comes up. Free from what? Free is a relative term, so as far as I can tell it should have to refer to some specific constraint that is not in place. How do people define "free will"?

In order to have free will w.r.t. a certain action, I would say it should mean your will is free from external force. Additionally, you must be in full control of your will and the entire decision-making process. And after the fact, it must be possible to regard you as responsible for the action.

Good question. If "free will" means "will free from determinism" or "free from causality", then that would suggest that making decisions arbitrarily for no reason would be more likely to be an exercise of "free will" than making decisions in a way that makes sense with respect to prior events.

Maybe determinism is acceptable and even necessary from a certain point in the decision-making process and onwards, just not at the very beginning where your desires and wants are formed.

 

[Blobbenstein]

Intelligently designed free will?

I think we have the free will that was there before the Universe.

I think abiogenesis is brought about because there is life at the atomic and subatomic level that created the first cells.

At the macroscopic level there is the sort of order that you can study with science, but at the smaller levels, it's a barn dance.

 

[cornsail]

In order to have free will w.r.t. a certain action, I would say it should mean your will is free from external force.

So let's say:

Example 1: I feel a cold breeze and I decide to put on a jacket
Example 2: I feel hungry and I decide to make myself a sandwich

In E1 my will to put on a jacket seems to be affected by an external force (the cold breeze). Does this mean it was not free will?

In E2 one could argue that the hunger is an "internal" force, so it's less obvious that external force is at play. Surely the decision is still contingent upon external forces in some way or another... but not necessarily directly.

Additionally, you must be in full control of your will and the entire decision-making process. And after the fact, it must be possible to regard you as responsible for the action.

Leaving aside the difficulties of defining the self (or "you") as a separate thing from the will that is conceived of as belonging to that self... Wouldn't addiction be a counter-example to that? If I'm trying to quit smoking I can't just decide to not want cigarettes anymore.

Maybe determinism is acceptable and even necessary from a certain point in the decision-making process and onwards, just not at the very beginning where your desires and wants are formed.

But mustn't our desires and wants either be caused or random? If they are random that doesn't seem to be any more satisfactory, as you pointed out. And it seems as if they are affected by causes (e.g. biological design) to at least some extent even at the basest levels.


My take on "free will" is that it doesn't really make sense as a concept once one delves into the nitty gritty of trying to define it.

 

[Blobbenstein]

My take on "free will" is that it doesn't really make sense as a concept once one delves into the nitty gritty of trying to define it.

if you could successfully define it, wouldn't that mean that mean it was just another deterministic system? Which would be self contradictory, I think. That's why I say it came first, and is undefinable.

 

[cornsail]

if you could successfully define it, wouldn't that mean that mean it was just another deterministic system? Which would be self contradictory, I think. That's why I say it came first, and is undefinable.

To have an opinion about free will, though, you must have some concept of what it means, even if you can't define it linguistically. There are many concepts that I don't think I could successfully define, but that I understand to an extent and that make sense to me ("happiness" and "consciousness" for example). My point is not that free will is undefinable (I'm not sure that's the case), it's that when I start thinking about how it could be defined, what would constitute free will vs not free will, what the ramifications are and so on, it makes less and less sense to me as a concept.

 

[beancounter]

So let's say:

Example 1: I feel a cold breeze and I decide to put on a jacket
Example 2: I feel hungry and I decide to make myself a sandwich

You can always choose not to put on a jacket or not to eat. But this is why I say free will exists within boundaries. One of those boundaries which I thought was too obvious to mention was self preservation. Everyone makes choices that will increase the chance of surviving for as long as possible. Some make good choices, others don't. But the fact that some people don't make good choices is a good argument for the existence of free will.

 

[K-II]

In order to have free will w.r.t. a certain action, I would say it should mean your will is free from external force. Additionally, you must be in full control of your will and the entire decision-making process. And after the fact, it must be possible to regard you as responsible for the action.

This sounds impossible. You were made by external forces. Even if you gained full control over your will, to the extent that you could choose your own tendencies, the things you chose to be would be influenced by what you were initially.

 

[nog]

I don't know what 'free will' really means.

I just feel like I can sometimes make the choice between 'A' and 'not A.'

 

[Second Summer]

So let's say:

Example 1: I feel a cold breeze and I decide to put on a jacket
Example 2: I feel hungry and I decide to make myself a sandwich

In E1 my will to put on a jacket seems to be affected by an external force (the cold breeze). Does this mean it was not free will?

In E2 one could argue that the hunger is an "internal" force, so it's less obvious that external force is at play. Surely the decision is still contingent upon external forces in some way or another... but not necessarily directly.

I think I had in mind a slightly different definition of "force", at least different from the one in your E1 example. At least if you could have acted differently: taken shelter, or wrapped yourself in a blanket instead of a jacket, or decided to start running to keep your temperature up etc. So if you had an actual choice, then you had free will, assuming the other criteria were also fulfilled.

Leaving aside the difficulties of defining the self (or "you") as a separate thing from the will that is conceived of as belonging to that self... Wouldn't addiction be a counter-example to that? If I'm trying to quit smoking I can't just decide to not want cigarettes anymore.

And yet some people do! Or at least they decide that even though they want cigarettes, they choose to override their desire and not smoke.

But mustn't our desires and wants either be caused or random? If they are random that doesn't seem to be any more satisfactory, as you pointed out. And it seems as if they are affected by causes (e.g. biological design) to at least some extent even at the basest levels.

A desire is only one part of the input to a decision-making process. We do not always want to act on them, and we may also have conflicting desires. Some desires may have originated beyond our control, perhaps as a result of indeterministic processes (e.g. a liking to lots and lots of cheesecake), whereas others are the results of our conscious thought-processes (e.g. a desire to have a slim figure).

 

[Envy]

To not act is also caused by a desire, a whim, or perhaps something else entirely.

I believe that free will, on a larger scale, does not exist.

 

[Digger]

No message board is complete without a long thread on free will!

And there you have it!

 

[Second Summer]

I think I had in mind a slightly different definition of "force", at least different from the one in your E1 example. At least if you could have acted differently: taken shelter, or wrapped yourself in a blanket instead of a jacket, or decided to start running to keep your temperature up etc. So if you had an actual choice, then you had free will, assuming the other criteria were also fulfilled.

And even if you didn't have an actual choice in this example, then that isn't an argument against free will as such, only an argument against free will in this particular instance.

 

[m-a-h]

My karma does not allow me to believe free will.

 

[cornsail]

I think I had in mind a slightly different definition of "force", at least different from the one in your E1 example. At least if you could have acted differently: taken shelter, or wrapped yourself in a blanket instead of a jacket, or decided to start running to keep your temperature up etc. So if you had an actual choice, then you had free will, assuming the other criteria were also fulfilled.

Well we could interpret "free from external force" to mean "not solely determined by external force", which would be true. The decision in that example is certainly partially determined by external force, though, because if it weren't for that force, the decision would not have been made. The only problem with this is, if we define "external force" as "external to the body", then it would seem to make free will trivially true. Everyone would agree that our choices are affected both by things going on in the brain and things going on outside the body. Would you define the brain as "external" to the self?

And yet some people do! Or at least they decide that even though they want cigarettes, they choose to override their desire and not smoke.

Yes, but some people want to, but don't (if not can't). If someone wishes they had better will power doesn't that mean they don't have complete control over their will?

A desire is only one part of the input to a decision-making process. We do not always want to act on them, and we may also have conflicting desires. Some desires may have originated beyond our control, perhaps as a result of indeterministic processes (e.g. a liking to lots and lots of cheesecake), whereas others are the results of our conscious thought-processes (e.g. a desire to have a slim figure).

I was just responding to your statement where you brought up wants and desires: "Maybe determinism is acceptable and even necessary from a certain point in the decision-making process and onwards, just not at the very beginning where your desires and wants are formed."

 

[Blues]

You can always choose not to put on a jacket or not to eat. But this is why I say free will exists within boundaries. One of those boundaries which I thought was too obvious to mention was self preservation. Everyone makes choices that will increase the chance of surviving for as long as possible. Some make good choices, others don't. But the fact that some people don't make good choices is a good argument for the existence of free will.

I sorta agree with yuh bean . Most of what we choose seems to have to do with our mental conditioning but it appears that after the decision is made the results (in some cases ) are out of control .
I can look at a car and choose to steal or not . If I choose not to steal it , I might walk around the corner and and meet the love of my life . If I steal , a cop comes along picks me up and I get chucked into the slammer ,I have no control over the situation that followed from the original decision to steal or not to steal the car .
So to me there appears to be limited free will .